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PROCEPT BioRobotics Corporation (PRCT)

Fair Value
HealthcareMedical DevicesUnited States

Fundamental

42

Price

$17.20

Market Cap

$1.04B

Part 1 · What the company is worth

Overview

PROCEPT BioRobotics is a US surgical-robotics company built around one therapy: Aquablation, a heat-free waterjet treatment for benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH), the enlarged prostate that affects most men as they age. It sells the AquaBeam Robotic System and its successor, the HYDROS Robotic System, which combine ultrasound imaging with a robotically controlled waterjet that removes prostate tissue without heat. The systems are placed in hospitals and surgical centres; a urologist maps the prostate on screen and the robot executes the resection. The company describes Aquablation as the first and only image-guided robotic therapy for BPH. It is not yet profitable: revenue was $308.1 million in fiscal 2025 against a net loss of $95.6 million.

How it makes money

Classic razor-and-blade. PROCEPT sells or rents the robotic console to a hospital — a one-off capital sale — and then earns recurring revenue on every procedure, because each Aquablation treatment consumes a single-use disposable handpiece. A third, smaller stream comes from service contracts on the installed base. The economics shift with the mix: in fiscal 2025 handpieces and consumables were already the largest line, so the installed base, not the year's console sales, is what drives the revenue line. Hospitals are the paying customers, and they in turn bill Medicare and commercial insurers for the procedure — so adequate reimbursement, not the surgeon alone, decides whether a system gets used.

Revenue by segment

Handpieces and other consumables58.9%

The single-use disposable handpiece consumed in every Aquablation procedure, plus related consumables, sold to the hospitals and surgical centres that already own a system. This is the recurring, per-procedure part of the business.

System sales and rentals34.5%

The AquaBeam and HYDROS robotic consoles themselves, sold outright or placed under rental arrangements with hospitals and surgical centres. Each placement is what opens the door to the recurring handpiece revenue that follows.

Service6.6%

Maintenance, support and training contracts on the installed base of robotic systems, sold to the hospitals that operate them.

Competitive moat

Switching costs · Narrow

Once a hospital installs an AquaBeam or HYDROS console, trains its urologists and builds a BPH pathway around it, the handpieces it buys are PROCEPT's and nobody else's — the console is a closed system, and a switch means writing off the capital equipment and retraining the surgeons. That is a real but narrow advantage: it holds the existing base, it does not win the next hospital. PROCEPT still has to displace entrenched alternatives — TURP, laser resection and Boston Scientific's Rezum, and Teleflex's UroLift — against competitors the company itself describes as larger and better resourced, and the whole franchise rests on one therapy in one indication.

What drives demand

Moderately cyclical

The two halves of the business behave differently. Handpiece demand follows BPH procedure volume, which is driven by an ageing male population and by a condition that does not go away when the economy turns — that part is close to defensive. System placements are capital purchases: they compete for a hospital's equipment budget, and the company discloses that customers face cost-containment pressure, which is exactly where a weaker budget cycle shows up. The filing does not discuss seasonality or economic cycles directly, so this reading comes from the structure of the revenue, not from a company statement.

Key risks

  • A history of losses, with no assurance of profitability — The company discloses significant net losses since inception and continuing operating losses, and states it may never achieve or sustain profitability; the 2025 net loss was $95.6 million.
  • Everything depends on one product family — Its business is tied to commercial success of the robotic systems and their handpieces for Aquablation therapy; a setback in that single franchise has nowhere else to land.
  • Surgeons and hospitals may not adopt the therapy — Growth requires market acceptance by hospitals, urologists and patients of a treatment that competes with long-established procedures; the company also flags limited experience in sales, marketing and building brand awareness.
  • Reimbursement can change against them — Hospitals buy only if third-party payors cover the procedure adequately; the filing flags coverage volatility and possible changes to reimbursement rates for BPH treatments.
  • Single-source suppliers — The company states it relies on third-party suppliers, almost all of them single source, for components, sub-assemblies and materials, which exposes it to shortages and price increases as it scales manufacturing.
  • Competition from far larger companies — It competes with resective surgical treatments including TURP and laser therapies from Boston Scientific, and with Rezum and Teleflex's UroLift, against rivals with greater financial and commercial resources.
  • Regulation and intellectual property — Ongoing regulatory compliance and post-market scrutiny of the devices, plus the cost and uncertainty of protecting patents and defending against intellectual-property litigation, are disclosed risks. Product liability exposure is flagged as well.

Customer concentration

The annual report does not disclose any customer concentration figure, and no single customer is identified as accounting for 10% or more of revenue. Structurally, revenue is spread across the hospitals and surgical centres that have installed a system, but no number is available to confirm how concentrated that base is.

The case for

Buyers argue that the razor-and-blade engine is now visibly working: revenue grew 37% to $308.1 million in 2025, and handpieces and consumables — the recurring line — were 58.9% of it, meaning each console placed keeps paying for years. They point to a large, demographically underpinned BPH population, to a therapy the company positions as the only image-guided robotic option, and to management's guidance of $390–410 million for 2026 as evidence the adoption curve is still steepening. On the cost side they note gross margin of 64% in 2025 and guidance of roughly 65% for 2026, and argue that with the installed base compounding, the fixed commercial spend eventually stops growing as fast as revenue.

The case against

Sellers fear a company that has never earned a profit and lost $95.6 million in 2025 while spending heavily to build a sales force, so the growth is being bought rather than thrown off. They fear the concentration of the whole thesis in one therapy for one indication, facing TURP, laser resection, Rezum and UroLift from competitors the company itself calls better resourced — and note that if payors trim reimbursement for BPH procedures, the hospital's incentive to buy handpieces changes overnight. They also point to the supply chain: almost all suppliers are single source, a fragile arrangement for a business scaling manufacturing, and to the disclosed risk of further share issuance diluting existing holders.

Generated on September 19, 2026 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users

Direct competitors

Who this company fights with for the same customers

No editorial profile for this company yet

No competitor list for this company yet.

Balance Sheet & Liquidity

Revenue

$337M

Trailing 12 months (through 6/30/2026)

Net Income

$-110M

Trailing 12 months (through 6/30/2026)

Free Cash Flow

$-58M

Total Equity

$366M

Total Liabilities

$142M

Current Ratio

6.55

Interest Coverage

32.88

Debt/EBITDA

-

Earnings Per Share

Revenue & Net Income

Free Cash Flow

Income Breakdown

Historical statement

Margins over time

Debt over time

How heavy the debt is

Growth grid

Growth — Revenue

Fair Value Estimation

General caseFairly Valued

Fair Value

$21.64

Current Price

$17.20

Margin of Safety

+20.5%

Fair Value Range

$20.55 - $22.72

Spread across the valuation methods used, not a statistically calibrated confidence interval.

Estimation Methods

Analyst price target:$21.64
Discounted cash flow (DCF):Not enough data to compute it
Earnings multiple (P/E):Not enough data to compute it
Graham growth formula:Not enough data to compute it
Earnings power value (EPV):Not enough data to compute it
Justified P/B:Not enough data to compute it
Dividend discount (Gordon):Not enough data to compute it
P/FFO, funds from operations:Not enough data to compute it
Mid-cycle earnings:Not enough data to compute it
Revenue multiple:$23.29
Analyst Consensus:Buy (10B / 10H / 1S)
Last Earnings Surprise:-0.84%

Valuation Metrics

P/E Ratio

-

ROE

-26.1%

P/B Ratio

3.07

P/FCF

-

Gross Margin

64.2%

ROIC

-21.7%

Profitability Radar

Value Creation (Economic Moat)

ROIC

-21.7%

WACC

9.1%

ROIC − WACC

-30.9 pp

ROIC is below the cost of capital — the company is destroying value for every dollar invested.

Fundamental Analysis Criteria

Passed (7)

  • EPS shows upward trend
  • Gross Margin 64.2%
  • Debt/Equity ratio
  • Current Ratio
  • Interest Coverage
  • Low reliance on intangibles
  • Revenue Growth 5Y 109.0%

Failed (13)

  • Price CAGR -6.27%
  • ROIC -21.7%
  • P/B Ratio 3.07
  • Operating Margin -33.9%
  • Positive Free Cash Flow
  • Return on Tangible Assets
  • DCF valuation (Unknown)
  • ROE -30.6%
  • Analyst Consensus 48% Buy
  • Earnings Surprise avg -12.6%
  • Share Dilution 6.4%
  • Net Margin Trend -32.5% vs -30.6%
  • Piotroski F-Score 3/9

Unavailable (7)

  • P/FCF NaN
  • Dividend Payout NaN%
  • CapEx intensity
  • Debt/EBITDA
  • Price below Graham Number
  • PEG Ratio (need PE > 0 and growth > 0)
  • Earnings Quality (OCF/Net Income)

Piotroski F-Score

3/9

Serious financial concerns

score
criteria

Earnings Quality

-

Low quality: investigate accounting

Share Dilution

6.4%

Issuing new shares, diluting ownership

Institutional Holdings

Governance

Executive Team

NameTitleAge
Mr. Larry L. WoodPresident, CEO & Director59
Mr. Kevin WatersExecutive VP & CFO48
Ms. Alaleh NouriEVP, Chief Legal Officer & Corporate Secretary46
Mr. Christofer ChristoforouExecutive Vice President of Operations55
Mr. Barry TemplinExecutive VP & CTO-
Mr. Matthew James Bacso C.F.A.Vice President of Investor Relations-
Ms. Pooja Sharma RaoExecutive VP and Chief Strategy & Marketing Officer-
Ms. Stacey L. PorterExecutive VP & Chief People Officer50
Mr. Bijesh ChandranExecutive Vice President of Regulatory Affairs & Quality Assurance-
Mr. Stephen J. McGillSenior VP & GM of International63

Audit Risk

6

Board Risk

5

Compensation Risk

10

Shareholder Rights Risk

8

Part 2 · The price and when to enter

This part won't tell you whether the company is worth owning: it helps you choose when to buy it, once the fundamentals have convinced you. Inside: technical analysis, potential, historical drawdowns, gamma exposure.

Documents

  • Annual Report (10-K)

    A yearly overview of the business, its financial results, and the risks it faces.

    Filed on 2026-02-26

    View document
  • Quarterly Report (10-Q)

    A snapshot of financial performance for the most recent three-month period.

    Filed on 2026-08-05

    View document
  • Current Report (8-K)

    An announcement of a major event, such as a leadership change or big news.

    Filed on 2026-09-24

    View document

via SEC EDGAR

Income History

via SEC EDGAR

Latest News

Recent headlines for PRCT, sourced from Markets Gazette.

No recent news for PRCT.