Laureate Education, Inc. (LAUR)
Fair ValueFundamental
71
Price
$38.16
Market Cap
$5.26B
Part 1 · What the company is worth
Overview
Laureate Education owns and operates private, degree-granting higher education institutions in just two countries, Mexico and Peru. As of 31 December 2025 it served roughly 497,700 students across five institutions and more than 50 campuses: Universidad del Valle de México (UVM) and Universidad Tecnológica de México (UNITEC) in Mexico, and Universidad Peruana de Ciencias Aplicadas (UPC), Universidad Privada del Norte (UPN) and the technical institute CIBERTEC in Peru. The institutions teach undergraduate, graduate and vocational programmes on campus, online and in hybrid format, with enrolment concentrated in medicine and health sciences, engineering and IT, and business and management. The group is what is left after years of divestitures: the company that once ran a global network of universities now runs two country platforms and nothing else.
How it makes money
Revenue is tuition and related fees paid by students and their families. The 10-K states that all 2025 revenues came from private-pay sources, because there are no material government-sponsored student loan programmes in Mexico or Peru — so the company is not dependent on public funding, but it is directly exposed to household ability to pay. Degree programmes typically run four to five years, so each cohort enrolled generates several years of tuition, which the company describes as giving high revenue visibility. Revenue therefore scales with two levers: the number of students enrolled each intake and the tuition price per student, and it is seasonal because it follows the academic intake calendar.
Revenue by segment
Two institutions — UVM, positioned as the premium/traditional brand, and UNITEC, the value/teaching brand — with about 269,400 students at year-end 2025. They sell undergraduate and graduate degrees to both school-leavers and working adults, on campus and online. Segment revenue was $877.4 million in 2025.
Three institutions — UPC (premium/traditional), UPN (value/teaching) and CIBERTEC (technical and vocational) — with about 228,300 students at year-end 2025, selling degree and technical programmes to traditional and adult students. Segment revenue was $824.4 million in 2025.
Competitive moat
Brand · NarrowThe company argues that its institutions are among the most respected higher-education brands in their local markets, that its country networks give it scale across curriculum, shared services and technology, and that accreditation and licensing — SUNEDU licences in Peru, REVOE programme recognitions in Mexico — are not quickly replicated, especially for capital-intensive fields such as its medical and dental schools. Those are real barriers, but bounded ones: the 10-K itself describes both markets as highly fragmented with large numbers of local competitors, and says the institutions compete on price, quality, reputation and location against public universities that receive substantial government subsidies and charge less. The advantage is local and defensible rather than wide.
What drives demand
Moderately cyclicalDemand rests on structural forces — a large young population in both countries, limited public university capacity, and the wage premium a degree still carries — which make it steadier than industrial demand. But because every peso and sol of tuition comes out of a household budget rather than a state programme, affordability matters: when family incomes, employment or the currency weaken, prospective students postpone enrolling, trade down to cheaper institutions, or drop out mid-programme, and the multi-year structure means a weak intake keeps weighing on revenue for several years afterwards. Revenue also moves with the academic calendar, which the company notes as seasonality.
Key risks
- Everything depends on two countries — Operations are concentrated entirely in Mexico and Peru, which the company says exposes it to complex business, political, legal, regulatory, tax and economic risks in those jurisdictions, with no geographic diversification to offset a downturn or a policy shift in either one.
- Enrolments and tuition may not hold up — The company lists among its risks its ability to maintain and then increase tuition rates and student enrolments. Since all revenue is private-pay, a fall in either lever feeds straight into results, and fixed campus costs do not fall with it.
- Shifting laws and licences — Programmes need official recognition to operate: REVOE authorisations from federal or state education authorities in Mexico, SUNEDU licensing in Peru. The filing states that failure to comply with applicable legal provisions may result in fines, cancellation of the REVOE and closure of the education facilities, and flags uncertain and changing laws and regulations in its markets.
- Reputation is part of the product — Laureate cites the vulnerability of its brands to negative publicity and social media, and the risk that its reputation is damaged by allegations directed at the for-profit and private education sector generally, even where they do not concern its own institutions.
- Currency — Revenues and costs are in Mexican pesos and Peruvian soles while the company reports in US dollars; the filing identifies fluctuations in the value of foreign currencies as a risk to its business and results.
- Competition and the online channel — The higher-education market is described as very competitive and highly fragmented, with many local players and subsidised public institutions. The company separately flags the risks of growing its online academic programmes and its dependence on the effectiveness of marketing and student recruitment.
- Debt and access to markets — Among its listed risks are those associated with indebtedness and with disruptions to credit and equity markets.
Customer concentration
There is no customer concentration in the usual sense: revenue comes from roughly 497,700 individual students paying their own tuition, spread across five institutions and more than 50 campuses, and the filing discloses no single customer of any significance. The concentration that does exist is different in kind — two countries, and a handful of brands within them.
The case for
Buyers argue that the two markets are structurally short of university places, that private-pay tuition with four- to five-year programmes gives unusually visible, recurring revenue, and that adding students to campuses and online programmes that already exist drops a large share of each extra peso to profit. They point to 2025 revenue of $1.70 billion, up 9% on 2024, with Peru growing 14% and enrolment rising in both countries, and to the fact that no government loan programme can be cut out from under the business. They also note that the group is now a focused two-country operator rather than the sprawling global portfolio it once was, which makes results easier to read and capital easier to return.
The case against
Sellers fear the concentration itself: two emerging markets, five brands, and no third leg to lean on. A recession, a currency slide or a political turn in Mexico or Peru hits revenue in dollars and household ability to pay at the same time, while campus costs stay put. They point to the regulatory dependence the company discloses — programmes operate on REVOE recognitions and SUNEDU licences that authorities can condition, suspend or withdraw — and to a fragmented competitive field where subsidised public universities and low-cost private entrants cap how far tuition can rise. They add that demographic tailwinds eventually fade, that online delivery invites competitors with no campuses to fund, and that reputational damage anywhere in the for-profit education sector can reach institutions that did nothing wrong.
Generated on September 19, 2026 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users
Direct competitors
Who this company fights with for the same customers
No editorial profile for this company yet
No competitor list for this company yet.
Balance Sheet & Liquidity
Revenue
$1.83B
Trailing 12 months (through 6/30/2026)
Net Income
$322M
Trailing 12 months (through 6/30/2026)
Free Cash Flow
$263M
Total Equity
$1.19B
Total Liabilities
$1.02B
Current Ratio
0.71
Interest Coverage
35.87
Debt/EBITDA
1.62
Earnings Per Share
Revenue & Net Income
Free Cash Flow
Income Breakdown
Historical statement
Margins over time
Debt over time
How heavy the debt is
Growth grid
Growth — Revenue
Fair Value Estimation
Fair Value
$40.08
Current Price
$38.16
Margin of Safety
+4.8%
Fair Value Range
$34.02 - $46.15
Spread across the valuation methods used, not a statistically calibrated confidence interval.
Estimation Methods
Valuation Metrics
P/E Ratio
17.35
ROE
23.7%
P/B Ratio
4.61
P/FCF
18.34
Gross Margin
27.3%
ROIC
18.5%
Profitability Radar
Value Creation (Economic Moat)
ROIC
18.5%
WACC
7.1%
ROIC − WACC
+11.4 pp
ROIC exceeds the cost of capital — the company is creating value for shareholders.
Fundamental Analysis Criteria
Passed (18)
- EPS shows upward trend
- Price CAGR 11.71%
- ROIC 18.5%
- P/FCF 18.34
- Debt/Equity ratio
- Operating Margin 24.4%
- Positive Free Cash Flow
- Interest Coverage
- Debt/EBITDA
- Return on Tangible Assets
- ROE 28.6%
- Revenue Growth 5Y 10.7%
- Analyst Consensus 77% Buy
- Earnings Surprise avg 16.5%
- Earnings Quality (OCF/NI) 1.27
- Share Dilution -3.5%
- Net Margin Trend 17.6% vs 16.4%
- Piotroski F-Score 7/9
Failed (7)
- Gross Margin 27.3%
- P/B Ratio 4.61
- CapEx intensity
- Current Ratio
- Low reliance on intangibles
- Price below Graham Number
- DCF valuation (Overvalued)
Unavailable (2)
- Dividend Payout NaN%
- PEG Ratio (need PE > 0 and growth > 0)
Piotroski F-Score
Strong financial health
Earnings Quality
High quality: earnings backed by cash
Share Dilution
Buying back shares. Shareholder friendly
Institutional Holdings
Governance
Executive Team
| Name | Title | Age |
|---|---|---|
| Mr. Eilif Serck-Hanssen | President, CEO & Director | 59 |
| Mr. Richard M. Buskirk | Senior VP & CFO | 48 |
| Mr. Marcelo Barbalho Cardoso | Executive VP & COO | 53 |
| Ms. Leslie S. Brush | Senior VP, Chief Legal Officer & Secretary | 61 |
| Mr. Gerard M. Knauer | VP of Accounting & Global Controller | 48 |
| Mr. Martin N. Fienkeng | Senior VP, Chief Information Officer & Chief Information Security Officer | - |
| Mr. Adam Smith | Senior Vice President of People & Culture | - |
| Mr. Adam Morse | Senior VP of Corporate Finance | - |
| Mr. Alejandro Gallo | Chief Executive Officer of Laureate Mexico | - |
| Mr. Alvaro Ramos Ramos | CEO of Laureate Peru | - |
Audit Risk
7
Board Risk
6
Compensation Risk
3
Shareholder Rights Risk
7
Part 2 · The price and when to enter
This part won't tell you whether the company is worth owning: it helps you choose when to buy it, once the fundamentals have convinced you. Inside: technical analysis, potential, historical drawdowns, gamma exposure.
Documents
- View document
Annual Report (10-K)
A yearly overview of the business, its financial results, and the risks it faces.
Filed on 2026-02-19
- View document
Quarterly Report (10-Q)
A snapshot of financial performance for the most recent three-month period.
Filed on 2026-07-30
- View document
Current Report (8-K)
An announcement of a major event, such as a leadership change or big news.
Filed on 2026-07-30
via SEC EDGAR
Income History
via SEC EDGAR
Latest News
Recent headlines for LAUR, sourced from Markets Gazette.
- 3/13/2026POSITIVEEducation Stock Up 84% as One Fund Ups Stake to Nearly $6 Million
Laureate Education Inc. has seen its stock surge by 84%, fueled by a significant investment from an undisclosed fund that has increased its stake to nearly $6 million. Laureate operates a network of universities across Latin America and the U.S., providing both campus-based and online degree programs. This substantial capital injection suggests strong confidence in the company's future growth prospects and operational strategy within the higher education sector. Investors may view this as a positive endorsement, potentially leading to further price appreciation and increased market interest.
via Markets Gazette